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“I’LL BE YOUR MIRROR” 1 – CONTEMPORARY
ART AND THE ROLE OF STYLE IN COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS
Arjun Gupta∗

We must expect great innovations to transform the entire
technique of the arts, thereby affecting artistic invention
itself and perhaps even bringing about an amazing change
in our very notion of art.2
- Paul Valéry, "La Conquete de l'ubiquite"

I.

INTRODUCTION

Works of visual art created in the modern era enter into what
German theorist Walter Benjamin calls the “Age of Mechanical
Reproduction.” In this context, Valéry’s great innovations refer to the
ability to produce multiple copies of a single painting or sculpture. Here,
the meaning of a work of art and its social, cultural, and economic reception
assumes an existence that is no longer only contingent upon the original or
authentic work. 3 As such, the copy embodies the possibility of experiencing
the work in different ways, in a multitude of places, and at any time.4 This
change in the circumstance under which art is created and experienced
results in the increasing irrelevance of the original. What was previously
considered the “aura”5 of authenticity, once experienced only through the

1

The Vel vet Underground & Nico, I’ll Be Your Mirror (Verve/Andy Warhol 1967) (L.P. recording).
∗ Staff Writer for the University of Dayton Law Review from 2004-2005, he received his J.D. from the
University of Dayton School of Law in May, 2005. Arjun Gupta received his B.A. from Amherst
College, M.A. from the University of Toronto, and has pursued graduate studies in art history at the
University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, U.K. and at the University of California,
Berkeley. He currently resides in San Francisco.
2
Paul Valéry, The Conquest of Ubiquity, in Aesthetics 225, 225 (Jackson Mathews, ed., Ralph Manheim
trans., Bollingen Series XLV vol. 13, Pantheon Books 1964).
3
Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in Illuminations 219
(Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968). “The presence of the
original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity.” Id. at 222.
4
“By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence. And in
permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates
the object reproduced.” Id. at 223.
5
Benjamin defines “aura” as the power of authenticity emanating from the unique presence of the
original object and its “historical testimony,” that is, its existence as a historical object. Id. at 223 -25.

Published by eCommons, 2005

46

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol.31.1

original object, is demystified – diminished by technological innovation.6
Benjamin’s prescient statement, “that which withers in the age of
mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art,” 7 describes a
paradigm shift in the way we perceive ourselves and the world around us.
Although the original work of art has lost the primacy it held before
the advent of modernity, it still retains value assigned by critics, the public,
and the market. It is also protected physically in galleries, museums, and
public and private spaces, and perhaps most importantly, by the law. The
Copyright Act of 1976 (“Act”) applies to “original works . . . fixed in any
tangible medium of expression” and works of visual art.8 As legislation
concerning intellectual property, these laws seek to protect and regulate the
ownership, integrity, and use of the original work of art. This comment will
examine the tension between copyright protection of reproduction and
distribution rights and contemporary works of art in claims of infringement.
Moreover, it will examine the role of the copy in the broader, cultural and
legal contexts. The ubiquity of the copy in contemporary American society
and the corresponding cultural devaluation of the original, informs this
larger context. It is through copies that a work of art is made available to
new and multiple audiences, interpretations, and meanings. Today, more
than ever before, technology enables the viewer to act as a participant in
forming and attributing meaning to a work of art. In this way, a work exists
through its public, indeed democratic, reception. Anyone may be complicit
in determining not only the meaning, but also the value of a work in the
economic market and in the critical marketplace of ideas.
Art that appropriates content (“appropriation art”) from other works
and sources of visual culture renders inadequate current interpretations of
copyright law in its exclusion o f alternate meanings in the act of copying.
Contemporary artists such as Jeff Koons, Mike Bidlo, and David Salle
create works that are not exact copies of works by other artists, but are
skillful appropriations of the subject matter and individual styles of their
models. Others such as Barbara Kruger, Cindy Sherman, and Sherry Levine
create similar work through the medium of photography, using a range of
images from popular cinema to advertising as models for appropriation.
Taking the notion of appropriation art to an extreme, New York artist Eric
Doeringer paints and sells works that mimic the paintings of other wellknown contemporary artists. In 1992, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held in Rogers v. Koons 9 that copying in appropriation art constituted
infringement and failed fair use criteria.10 This comment argues that Rogers
was wrongly decided. Moreover, relying on the proposition that owners of

6

“[M]echanical reproduction emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual. To
an ever greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility.”
Id. at 226.
7
Id. at 223.
8
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
9
960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); see infra § III, especially §§ III(A)(2) and III(B)(1).
10
Id. at 308.
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copied originals hold valid, registered copyrights, this comment further
examines the interpretive problems that appropriation art presents to the
finder of fact. At the heart of this inquiry is the issue of whether the
unauthorized appropriation of another artist’s style constitutes copyright
infringement or a legitimate act of copying. Within the scope of copyright
law and its application to art, the problem is rooted in the notion of style and
whether an artist’s style is an idea that exists separately from its expression.
This comment argues that appropriation art, although an example of
“substantially similar” copying, is not derivative work and would prevail
against a claim of infringement. By proving an affirmative defense of fair
use, such copying would not be considered infringing, but as functioning to
comment on or critique social, cultural, economic, and political elements in
contemporary American culture. In this context, copying as artistic
appropriation represents a cultural interchange that furthers the
Constitutional aim of copyright protection – “to promote the progress of . . .
useful Arts.”11
Section II will begin with a brief description of the elements of
copyright infringement, substantial similarity, and the notion of originality
as it relates to derivative works. This section ends by providing a critical art
historical framework for the nexus between appropriation and style in
contemporary art. Section III discusses the way style functions in the
infringement analysis. This section then examines the ways courts apply the
idea/expression dichotomy to visual art. Subsequently, the analysis
addresses the issue of style as a function of originality in the infringement
analysis.
Finally, Section III focuses on fair use with regard to
appropriation art. Although no t parody, such work is an example of cultural
interchange – representing an area of specialized theory that should remain
safe from judicial determinations of value or meaning. Section IV
concludes by asserting that works of art that constitute a form of copying
cannot be considered as infringing upon copyright in the original work.
Moreover, the conclusion asserts that the fair use standard must be applied
in a more flexible manner so that the Constitutional purpose behind
copyright law meets changed notions of art and its technological
circumstances.
II.

BACKGROUND

To better understand the application of copyright law with respect to
contemporary art, it is necessary to outline the elements of copyright
infringement. Subsequently, this section examines theories of artistic style,
the cultural impact of post-structuralist theory, and appropriation in
contemporary art.

11

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (hereinafter referred to as the “Intellectual Property Clause”).
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Elements of Copyright Infringement

The first Copyright Act of 1790 was passed pursuant to the
Constitutional provision granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”12 In keeping with its purpose to give authors power over their
works for a specific period of time, copyright law has evolved to
accommodate two centuries of technological and cultural change.13 In its
current statutory code, the Act protects “original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression.”14
Pursuant to § 102(a)(5) of the Act, “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works”15 comprise one category that is subject to copyright protection. The
scope of protection grants exclusive rights in an author’s artistic creations,
including the right to “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies, . . . prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work, . . . distribute copies . . .
of the copyrighted work to the public, . . . [and] display the copyrighted
work publicly.” 16 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.,17 the Supreme Court’s requirements to prove a claim for infringement
of an owner’s copyright consisted of showing valid ownership of the
copyright and “copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original.”18 Ownership, for th e purpose of an infringement claim, subsists in

12

Id.
Julie E. Cohen, Lydia Pallas Loren, Ruth Gana Okediji, Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright in a Global
Information Economy 31 (Aspen L. & Bus. 2002).
13

The first Copyright Act, enacted in 1790, extended copyright protection to authors
of maps, charts, and books. Over the next century, Congress gradually expanded
the list to include engravings, etchings, and prints (1802); musical compositions
(1831); dramatic compositions (1856); photographs and negatives (1865); and
paintings, drawings, chromolithographs, statuary, and ‘models or designs intended
to be perfected as works of the fine arts’ (1870).
Id. The 1909 Copyright Act included photographs, prints and pictorial illustrations, periodicals
(including newspapers), lectures, sermons, and “all the writings of an author.” Id. Later additions
included “motion pictures other than photoplays (1912)” and “sound recordings (1971).” Id.
14
17 U.S.C. § 102.
15
Id. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) states:
‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ include two-dimensional and threedimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings,
including architectural plans. Such works shall include works of artistic
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects
are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of t he article.
16
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3), (5) (2000).
17
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
18
Id. at 361. This infringement standard is known as the “Feist Test.”
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the owner’s valid “registration of the copyright claim.”19 The defendant’s
copying must be unauthorized for proof of infringement; however, the
substance and nature of such copying has remained a considerably abstract
and problematic element that defies exact definition. 20
The second prong in the Feist standard for infringement, that there
be unauthorized copying, has been interpreted in two distinct ways by the
“two major copyright courts – the Second and Ninth Circuits.” 21 The
Second Circuit held that unauthorized copying is illegal when “the copying
amounts to an ‘improper’ or ‘unlawful’ appropriation.”22 What constitutes
such appropriation? The Second Circuit requires that “a substantial
similarity exist[] between the defendant's work and the protectible elements
of plaintiff's.” 23 Thus, the allegedly infringing material must be derived
from the plaintiff’s copyright protected work and must be an unauthorized
appropriation. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Feist test requires
“circumstantial evidence of access and substantial similarity of both the
general ideas and expression between the copyrighted work and the
allegedly infringing work.”24 Here, the plaintiff must prove access to the
copyrighted material and that the alleged infringing material is substantially
similar to the protected work. The distinction between “derivation and
improper appropriation . . . is conspicuously absent in the Ninth Circuit's
test.” 25
Absent the derivation requirement of the Second Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit’s test, after proving ownership of a valid copyright, consists solely of
a finding of substantial similarity. The Ninth Circuit’s inquiry into
substantial similarity consists of a subjective and an objective test. 26 For the
Second Circuit, substantial similarity means “the defendant appropriated the
plaintiff's particular means of expressing an idea, not merely that he
expressed the same idea.”27 In light of these circuit approaches, findings o f
infringement turn on the court’s determination of which elements of a work
constitute infringing material, and how they are made manifest in a
defendant’s work. What is clear is that infringing material be an original
fixed expression because “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea.”28

19

17 U.S.C. § 411(b) (2000).
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright vol. 4, § 13.03 (Matthew Bender & Co.
2004).
21
Douglas Y’Barbo, The Origin of the Contemporary Standard for Copyright Infringement, 6 J. Intell.
Prop. L. 285 (1999).
22
Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1992)).
23
Fisher Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1994).
24
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Brown Bag
Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1992)).
25
Y’Barbo, supra n. 21, at 292.
26
See infra § II(A)(1).
27
Fisher-Price, Inc., 25 F.3d at 123.
28
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
20
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Substantial Similarity

Today, it is generally accepted that although a defendant’s copying
need not be exact, a finding of substantial similarity “is an essential element
of actionable copying.”29 While courts have developed various tests for
determinations of substantial similarity in copying that is allegedly
infringing, there are two basic forms of similarity that should be addressed
prior to inquiries of substantiality.
Nimmer distinguishes between
“comprehensive nonliteral similarity and fragmented literal similarity.” 30
Nonliteral similarity refers to a work that, while not sharing identical formal
elements (e.g. text or pictorial form), duplicates “the fundamental essence or
structure” 31 of copyright protected material. An exact copy of an entire
work would be an example of comprehensive literal similarity. But
replication of portions of a copyright protected work may be more difficult
to ascertain, leading to the problem of fragmented literal similarity. Both
types of substantial similarity have their analytical difficulties and their
respective tests.
In cases involving comprehensive nonliteral similarity, analysis of
infringement involves the challenge of distinguishing elements of
expression from ideas. As protection is afforded only to “the expression of
the idea – not the idea itself,”32 there is a considerable degree of abstraction
involved in the deconstruction of any specific work to isolate expression
from idea. This continuum concerning the realization of idea into fixed
expression is referred to as the “idea/expression dichotomy.”33 Nimmer
asserts that although courts have found substantial similarity “where the
common pattern consisted of little more than a basic idea,”34 theoretically,
elements of “format, theme, style, or setting” 35 are considered ideas and
therefore not protected by copyright.36 Nevertheless, as the analysis below
shows, the idea/expression dichotomy presents different analytical
challenges from one medium of expression to another.
Where there is a situation involving fragmented literal similarity,
the problem of substantial similarity involves determining what amount of
material representing literal copying is sufficient to be considered
substantial and thus, infringing. There is no standard measure as to what
amount of material is or is not permissible.37 The issue is “whether the
similarity relates to matter that constitutes a substantial portion of plaintiff's
work – not whether such material constitutes a substantial portion of

29

Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 20, at § 13.03(A).
Id.
31
Id. at § 1 3.03(A)(1).
32
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
33
Cohen et al., supra n. 13, at 90.
34
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 20, at § 13 .03(B)(2)(a).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at § 1 3.03(A)(2).
30
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defendant's work.” 38 Furthermore, quantitative analysis alone cannot
determine the importance of a portion’s meaning or value to the work.
Consequently, qualitative judgments also inform the analysis of substantial
similarity concerning the fragmented literal appropriation of protected
material. 39
a.

Tests for Substantial Similarity

Courts have developed a number of tests to determine whether
allegedly infringing material satisfies the substantial similarity requirement.
There are approximately five such tests (and a number of variations) used,
sometimes in combination, by courts analyzing infringement claims. One of
the earliest, the “abstractions test,” 40 addressed the threshold problem of
isolating idea from expression prior to analysis of substantial similarity.41
Judge Learned Hand’s abstractions test, developed in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp.,42 compares “the similarities between the two works as a
‘series of abstractions’ of increasing generality.” 43 Like the abstractions test,
the “patterns test” 44 examines the “‘pattern’ of the work . . . the sequence of
events, and the development of the interplay of the characters.”45 Both the
abstractions and patterns tests offer useful approaches to analyzing
potentially infringing works, but neither test clarifies what level of similarity
must exist before judging two works as substantially similar.
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 46 the Ninth Circuit employed the “extrinsic-intrinsic test,” 47
examining the similarity of general ideas and specific expressions between
two works.48 The first step is the extrinsic part of the test that compares the
general ideas of the two works through “specific criteria which can be listed
and analyzed.”49 The second step in the Krofft analysis, the intrinsic test,
considers the similarity between forms of expression and relies on the
“response of the ordinary reasonable person.”50 The intrinsic, or subjective,
portion of the test is a layer of scrutiny applied at the end of a court’s
analysis. This is also called the “audience test”51 and considers whether a
representative of the work’s intended audience would view the works in

38

Id.
Id.
40
Jarrod M. Mohler, Student Author, Toward a Better Understanding of Substantial Similarity in
Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 971, 980 (2000).
41
Id.
42
45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
43
Jay Dratler, Jr., Intellectual Property Law: Commercial, Creative, and Industrial Property vol. 1, §
5.01(2)(c) (L. J. Press 1995).
44
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 513-14 (1945).
45
Id.
46
562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
47
Id. at 1165 n. 7.
48
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n. 20, at § 13 .03(A)(1)(c).
49
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
50
Id.
51
Y’Barbo, supra n. 21, at 297.
39
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question as similar.52
The Krofft decision uses the phrase “total concept and feel,” 53
describing the similarity between the copyrighted work and the alleged
infringing material. 54 The “total concept and feel” of a work considers the
idea of the work and its formal elements as a whole.55 The inclusion of
concepts in determinations of substantial similarity is problematic because it
involves a comparison of ideas not protected by copyright.56 In this context,
“‘total concept and feel’ should not be viewed as a sine qua non for
infringement – similarity that is otherwise actionable cannot be rendered
defensible simply because of a different ‘concept and feel.’”57
An allegedly infringing work may have copied both protected and
unprotected elements from the copyright owner’s work. In determinations
of substantial similarity, there is inconsistency among courts as to whether
or not to include unprotected elements in their analysis. For example, taking
a total concept and feel approach, a court will necessarily include
unprotected elements. This analysis is problematic because elements not
protected under copyright cannot be misappropriated. Therefore, they
cannot contribute to the overall claim of infringement. The problem of
including concepts in the total concept and feel approach to infringement is
also compounded by its potential inclusion of expression that is unprotected
and therefore lawful.
2.

The Derivative Work and Originality

The ability to authorize and “prepare derivative works”58 is one of
the exclusive rights granted to a copyright holder by the Act. The term
“derivative work” applies to a work that is “based upon one or more
preexisting works . . . in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted.”59 This definition is broad enough to encompass “work consisting
of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship.”60 The right to
derivative works is a result of the economic rationale behind copyright law.
For Goldstein, “[d]erivative rights affect the level of investment in
copyrighted works by enabling the copyright owner to proportion its
investment to the level of expected returns from all markets, not just the

52

“Two works are substantially similar where ‘the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the
disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard [the] aesthetic appeal [of the two works] as
the s ame.’” Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 139 (quoting Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1072 (2d
Cir. 1992)).
53
562 F.2d at 1167 (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
1970)).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 11 64.
56
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra n.20, at § 13 .03(A)(1)(c).
57
Id.
58
17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
59
Id. at § 101 (providing examples of “a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, [or] condensation.”).
60
Id.
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market in which the work first appears.”61
To establish a derivative work, the requirements of transformation
and originality combine to create a new work eligible for copyright
protection. Copyright protection is the same for the categories of works
enumerated in § 102 as it is for various types of derivative works.62 Those
portions of a derivative work that use preexisting material unlawfully (i.e.
without authorization) are not protected by copyright.63 According to the
House Report for the Act, infringement of the right to prepare derivative
works occurs when the infringing work “incorporate[s] a portion of the
copyrighted work in some form”64 without authorization of the copyright
owner. 65 Moreover, protection in derivative works “extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work.”66
Originality, as a requirement for copyright protection, has been
interpreted by the courts in two ways. In its 1903 decision, Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co.,67 the Supreme Court presented the concept
of originality as a creative impulse that “always contains something unique.
It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of
art has in it something irreducible, which is one m an's alone.”68 Thus, under
the Bleistein standard, originality subsists in the unique, personal
contribution of the author. The standard articulated in Feist requires de
minimis proof that the “work was independently created by the author”69 and
that the “requisite level of creativity is extremely low.”70 The Feist standard
emphasizes creativity, however slight, over the unique. A finding of
originality in a derivative work turns on the extent and the method by which
an author has “recast, transformed, or adapted”71 a preexisting work. The
analysis below shows that opinions concerning appropriation art favor the
economic rationale behind a derivative work without distinguishing between
a derivative copy and an appropriation that represents an independent,
original work of art.
B.

Style, Post-Structuralist
Contemporary Art

Theory,

and

1.

Changing Notions of “Style” in Art History

Appropriation

in

Artists such as Sherry Levine, Mike Bidlo, Jeff Koons, and Larry

61

Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. Copy. Socy. 209, 227
(1983).
62
17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
63
Id.
64
H.R. Rpt. 94-1476 , at 62 (Sept. 3, 1976).
65
Id.
66
17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
67
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
68
Id. at 250.
69
499 U.S. at 345.
70
Id.
71
17 U.S.C. § 101.
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Rivers, sometimes referred to as “appropriationist artists,” copy and
manipulate the pictorial imagery of other artists and sources of visual culture.
Such artists belong to a pattern of artistic production involving models,
copying, and transformation that represent a pervasive practice throughout
the history of art. 72 In this historical context, copying and visual
appropriation is often integral to the development of what art historians and
theorists such as Heinrich Wölfflin73 and Ernst Gombrich74 define as artistic
style. Understanding the role of artistic appropriation and its relation to
copyright law begins with a discussion of the notion of style in
contemporary art.
Categorization according to style and the use of stylistic analysis are
the primary art historical methods in identifying the time, place of
production, and author of a work of art. Style refers to both the conceptual
category to which an object belongs and to the technique used in its
production.75 Thus, style functions as a mode of classifying visual forms
and as a means of authenticating the individual work of art. In its latter role,
style is inherently linked to connoisseurship and valuation. For Gombrich,
The distinctive character of styles clearly rests on the
adoption of certain conventions which are learned and
absorbed by those who carry on the tradition. . . . While
certain of these features are easily recognizable (e.g., the
Gothic pointed arch, the cubist facet, Wagnerian
chromaticism), others are more elusive, since they are found
to consist not in the presence of individual, specifiable
elements but in the regular occurrence of certain clusters of

72

Certain artistic traditions such as Chinese landscape painting have developed according to an
established practice of emulating the works and styles of prior masters in order to achieve one’s own
individual style. Sherman E. Lee, A History of Far Eastern Art 463 (Naomi Noble Richard ed., PrenticeHall, Inc. 1994). Other traditions such as Renaissance painting or Gothic religious sculpture are based on
the repetition of and improvisation on established iconographic models. H. W. Janson, A Basic History
of Art 118-250 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1971). Thus, the copying of style is, to a great extent, a part of all art
production in that the artist is aware of and refers to a visual culture in varying degrees.
73
Heinrich Wölfflin (1864-1945) was one of the most influential art historians of the 19th and 20th
centuries, teaching history and art history at universities in Basle, Munich, Berlin, and Zurich. Wölfflin’s
chief articulation of the notion of style is his assertion of five visual concepts that form the analytical
tools determining the phases of early, classic, and baroque Renaissance art in Italy. Eric Fernie, Art
History and its Methods: A Critical Anthology 127 (Phaidon Press Ltd. 1998). See e.g. Heinrich Wölfflin,
Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art (M. D. Hottinger trans.,
6th ed., Dover Publications, Inc. 1950).
74
Ernst Gombrich was “Director and Professor of History of the Classical Tradition at the Warburg
Institute, University of London, 1959-76, and Slade Professor at both Oxford and Cambridge.” The Art
of Art History: A Critical Anthology 574 (Donald Preziosi ed., Oxford U. Press 1998). See e.g. E. H.
Gombrich, Philip Maurice Deneke Lecture, In Search of Cultural History (Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford,
Nov. 19, 1967) (reprinted in E. H. Gombrich, Ideals and Idols: Essays on Values in History and in Art 24
(Phaidon Press Ltd. 1979)). In this essay, Gombrich distinguishes between the stylistic “period,” a
Hegelian collective event in which individuals are subordinated, and stylistic “movement” which is the
product of individuals and their varied intentions. Id.
75
According to the Oxford Dictionary, “style” is defined as “1) a manner of doing something . . . a way
of painting . . . 2) a distinctive appearance, typically determined by the principles according to which
something is designed.” The Oxford American College Dictionary 1370 (Christine A. Lindberg, e d., G.
P. Putnam’s Sons 2002).
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features and in the exclusion of certain elements.76

Despite its established use as an instrument of art historical analysis and
interpretation, the notion of style and its importance has changed
dramatically since the 1970’s. Today, style is highly problematic when used
in reference to contemporary works of art.
In his essay on the “Modern, Postmodern, and Contemporary,”
Arthur Danto asserts that whereas modern art “had a stylistic meaning and a
temporal meaning”77 (i.e. the product of Modernism), contemporary art does
not.78 Contemporary art, while chronologically following post-modernism,
leaves the viewer with “the sense that we have no identifiable style, that
there is nothing that does not fit.”79 Indeed, it is this “lack of a stylistic unity,
or at least the kind of stylistic unity which can be elevated into a criterion
and used as a basis for developing a recognitional capacity.”80 As such, art
after the twentieth century period of modernism is what Danto refers to as
“post-historical.”81 Danto means it is art freed from a historical context and
its classifications of style and meaning; it is the product of contemporary
circumstance and creative processes where “anything ever done could be
done today.”82 Danto offers the example of a contemporary artist who, by
appropriating the corpus of Piero della Francesca, copies the Renaissance
painter, but whose copies cannot be considered as belonging to the same
style. 83 Piero della Francesca belongs to a stylistic tradition rooted in
Renaissance humanism, Albertian perspective, and papal patronage,
whereas the contemporary artist who appropriates his work belongs to our
world. His contemporary counterpart, the appropriating painter, produces
work in a context where elements belonging to past styles may be used free
from their underlying principles and contexts.
In one sense, Danto’s post-historical phase is art “after the end of art
[history].”84 Citing the 1960’s as the last period of identifiable styles, Danto
states “it gradually became clear, first through the nouveaux realistes and
pop, that there was no special way works of art had to look in contrast to
what I have designated ‘mere real things.’ . . . It meant that as far as
appearances were concerned, anything could be a work of art.”85 Danto
suggests that the meaning of contemporary art, inasmuch as its intentions
are conceptual, is based on philosophical considerations rather than on the
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formal, pictorial criteria of style. In other words, contemporary art
represents a mode of production that is beyond style. Stated differently, it is
art that functions beyond representation, and whose meaning is no longer
derived from what its style or appearance may represent historically.
While the concept of style follows an evolution that may be traced
through art history and semiotic theory, this guiding logic exists outside the
scope of judicial determinations. Courts are inconsistent and arbitrary in
their perception of style and its role in copyright infringement. 86 In
discussions of style involving copyright infringement claims, this comment
will use the term as it applies to an individual artist’s formal pictorial
characteristics. In this sense, style refers to the artist’s idiom or formal
language that may be perceived (in the work) as a result of individual
practices of production.
2.

Post-Structuralist Theory and Appropriation in Contemporary Art

How does artistic appropriation function in the field of
contemporary art? Appropriation, plagiarism, copying, replication, and
mimetic transfer are terms qualifying ways that art functions in a poststructuralist context. In this sense, painting, as a visual language,
communicates through signs and their meanings. A painted image may be
read as a sign defined by its difference from other signifiers. Poststructuralists, such as Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida,
use semiotics as a starting point to consider the meaning of a work which is
derived through deconstructing the work, or by tracking the signifiers.87 In
this process, meaning is not determined by the author, who has disappeared
into the text because of the infinite referrals of signifiers, but by the reader.
Thus, Foucault and Barthes assert that understanding a text (or a work of art)
begins with the “death” of the author.88 In art history, post-structuralist
theory challenges the assumptions of creativity and the importance of the
individual artist as an author. With the death of the author, the multiple and
often contradictory meanings of a work are revealed or re-invented through
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See infra § III.
See e.g. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Alan Bass trans., U. of Chicago Press 1978); Roland
Barthes, The Death of the Author, in Image, Music, Text 142 (Stephen Heath trans., Hill and Wang 1977);
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (R. D. Laing ed., A. M. Sheridan Smith trans.,
Pantheon Books 1972).
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Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in The Foucault Reader 101, 102, 104 (Paul Rabinow ed.,
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Today’s writing has freed itself from the dimension of expression. Referring only
to itself, but without being restricted to the confines of its interiority, writing is
identified with its own unfolded exteriority. This means that it is an interplay of
signs arranged less according to its signified content than according to the very
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the deconstruction of the work, making the very notion of what is original
to the work problematic.
Through its specific form of copying, appropriation art embodies a
challenge to notions of style, authorship, and authenticity. The complete or
partial appropriation of prior artistic material in post-industrial times begins
with the origins of Modernism and Edouard Manet’s controversial work
“Olympia,” a portrait of a prostitute posed in the manner of the Renaissance
painter Titian’s famous portrait of the Roman goddess of love, “Venus of
Urbino.” 89 Later appropriations by artists such as Pablo Picasso, George
Braque, and Marcel Duchamp relied upon the use of the “ready-made
object” as a compositional component in collage, painting, and sculpture.90
More recently, Pop artists such as Andy Warhol, 91 Larry Rivers, 92 and
Robert Rauschenburg93 employed reproductions of a single commercial or
art historical image as the basis for certain works.
The working methods of artists who appropriate imagery vary from
one individual to the next. For example, Eric Doeringer scans and isolates
the main compositional element in a painting and then assembles it against a
painted background.94 The surface of his painting is then brushed with clear
acrylic gel to give the impression of a painted surface.95 Other images by
Doeringer that are based on works of other artists are created through digital
manipulation on the computer and then transferred onto canvas.96 Such
works “copy the look of the originals.” 97 Similarly, works based on
photographs are digital manipulations by Doeringer attempting to capture
the look of another artist’s work.98 Mike Bidlo creates full-scale replicas
(paintings and found object assemblages) by such famous artists as Picasso,
Leger, Duchamp, and Man Ray,99 signed with his own name with titles such
as Not Picasso. Artists such as Bidlo, Doeringer, Levine, and Koons do not
obscure the origins of their appropriated elements. In fact, the identification
of appropriated material is often important to the interpretation of the work
in that it evokes meanings and associations which the viewer brings to the
work.
Regarding the economic and legal framework created by copyright
law, it is significant that much contemporary art, whether painting, sculpture,
installation, or audiovisual media, relies on appropriation of other work to
varying degrees. Such appropriation, while not always of the type
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94
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implicated in what courts might consider substantially similar, uses existent
and sometimes copyright protected imagery drawn from contemporary
visual culture. Their use of preexisting works, appropriation art, and much
contemporary art in general, challenges the tenet that “[t]he sine qua non of
copyright is originality.”100 Reference to other works may be viewed as part
of a creative response to the global lexicon of images. This visual culture is
a source of representation by contemporary artists and may be termed as the
“period eye,” 101 a phrase referring to particular ways of seeing and
representing linked to one’s physical and temporal context.
As
distinguished from visual style, the period eye refers to a “culture’s
cognitive style,” 102 the way we engage in “visual experience and
disposition.”103 In this context, all artists, regardless of the extent or nature
of appropriation in their work, participate in the generation of contemporary
visual culture through the production and exhibition of their work.
III.

ANALYSIS

In its application to appropriation art, the substantial similarity test
further confuses the already vague analytical boundaries of idea and
expression in copyright law. As works of art, appropriations stand on their
own as independent expressions presented to the viewer for interpretation.
Like all works of art, appropriation is a representation in that it reflects or
stands in for an artist’s intentions, ideas, or impulses. By extension, the
work also re-presents the concerns, aims, and values of a people, culture,
and time. Works of appropriation art are no less representations than other
categories of art in that they too embody the object(s) of an artist’s pleasures
and pains, whims or concerns. This analysis considers how courts have
dealt with appropriation art in cases of copyright infringement.
The first part of the analysis discusses the notion of an artist’s style
as it informs the copy and its relation to the idea/expression delineation in
the infringement analysis. This section examines the characterization of
style in the analysis of infringement, and the ways in which courts consider
the formal components of a work as either idea or expression. The second
part of the analysis focuses on the role of style and its relation to originality
as an element in claims of infringement. The final section considers judicial
interpretations of the fair use standard as a defense in infringement cases
involving artistic appropriation. This section addresses the elements of
comment, criticism, and parody and their application under fair use.
A.

Style and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Infringement

Visual art functions through the expression of line, form, texture,
and color. In turn, this formal expression is read by the viewer. Thus, a
work of art is interpreted through its presence as a physical representation
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Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
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through its formal elements (e.g. color, line, form, and texture). As stated in
§ 102(b) of the Act, expression is protected by copyright. Thus, the
question of whether a work of art infringes turns on whether its expression is
substantially similar to that of a copyright protected work. In the context of
infringement analysis, an artist’s style is problematic when distinguishing
the expression or style of a work from the idea or impulse it represents. The
late critic Susan Sontag asserts that one cannot speak of style versus content
because “[t]o speak of style is one way of speaking about the totality of a
work of art.”104 For example, a painting of water lilies by Monet may be
considered as part idea or content (water lilies) and part expression (the
impressionistic appearance of Monet’s painting). Yet to speak of Monet’s
water lilies evokes an image of water lilies that exists only by way of
Monet’s style, that is, his impressionism. For Monet, this impressionism,
the notion that the visual world exists as light and color, is an idea expressed
in an image of water lilies. Thus, according to Sontag, “[i]n art, ‘content’ is,
as it were, the pretext, the goal, the lure which engages consciousness in
essentially formal processes of transformation.” 105
The formal
transformation is the process of artistic representation. Thus, the subject of
water lilies is neither expression nor idea alone, but a site of representation
where choices are realized as an image on canvas. Yet theoretically, under
copyright law, a copy of the water lily as content is not infringing so long as
it is not expressed through Monet’s impressionist style. This part of the
analysis will examine the ways in which courts have addressed the problem
of style in terms of the idea/expression dichotomy. The first section
considers judicial approaches to the notion of style in copyright
infringement analysis. The second section discusses the ways in which
courts consider formal elements in terms of the idea/expression paradigm in
copyright law.
1.

Approaches to Style in the Infringement Analysis

Given that representation is central to art production, it is useful to
examine the role of representation as artistic style in claims of copyright
infringement. One of the earliest and most formative discourses on art
articulates the notion of mimesis, or art that is an “imitation of reality.”106
For Plato, artistic creation is likened to when “you take a mirror and turn it
round to all sides. You will soon make a sun and stars, the earth, yourself,
and other living creatures, manufactured articles and plants, and
everything.”107 The act of mimetic creation or imitation, what is referred to
as naturalistic representation, is a form of copying. Mimesis also informs
appropriation art which constitutes one of the most conscious and direct
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references to an individual’s visual culture. 108 But such works of art
function in ways other than simply as imitative reflection or secondary
representation. A work of appropriation art is also an object (albeit a copy)
that is complete and distinct from other objects. Copyright law seeks to
protect this singular, authentic aspect of artwork with regard to the original,
but it often does so at the expense of the representational function of the
work that appropriates, thereby imposing legal limits on the scope of
contemporary art.109
Two judicial opinions that articulate the boundaries regarding style
and its role in infringement analysis are Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. 110 and Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art
Exchange, Inc.111 Taken together, both cases describe distinctions between
stylistic elements that courts characterize as either objective or subjective in
their appearance. The privileging of one type of style over another in
determinations of infringement reveals a concession to the analytical judicial
process that both serves and undercuts the purpose of copyright. In its
former effect, it protects the interests of the owner of the original work. In
its latter effect, such thinking fails to embrace alternate modes of artistic
practice that take as their subject the very notions of art, originality, value,
and meaning. The infringement analysis as applied to works of visual art
considers stylistic elements copied from the original work as objective (noninfringing) versus subjective (infringing).
In Franklin Mint Corp., the court held that defendant’s painting,
“The Cardinal,” infringed plaintiff’s copyright in an earlier work by the
same artist entitled “Cardinals on Apple Blossom.” 112 The court found the
later painting of cardinals did not infringe upon the earlier work, holding
that “while the ideas are similar, the expressions are not,” 113 and the
differences between the works are “sufficient to establish a diversity of
expression rather than only an echo.” 114 While acknowledging expert
testimony “to support and refute substantial similarity,” 115 the court’s
rationale relied upon its characterization of the artist’s style in relation to the
subject matter.
The works in Franklin Mint Corp. are representations of cardinals in
a style that is referred to in art history as “naturalism,” a term used to
describe the striking realism, or resemblance to nature, in works of
Renaissance painters such as Caravaggio.116 Naturalism is generally defined

108

See supra § II(B).
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as a style of visual or literary representation “based on the accurate
depiction of detail.” 117 But for the artist, naturalism is as contrived a
representational method as any other in that “an understanding of the visible
world always involves the use of conventions . . . in the case of the
rendering of one image in the medium of another.”118 Pictorial conventions
such as the Albertian perspective, a Renaissance system of ordering forms
on a two-dimensional surface to create the illusion of depth,119 are employed
in the service of naturalism in art. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals did
not take into account the stylistic component to naturalism in its rationale.
For the court, naturalism as a realistic or scientific mode of representation is
not considered in stylistic terms, but as a baseline visual schematic that is
not as “expressive” of an artist’s subjectivity.120 On the other hand, the
naturalistic depiction of a cardinal intended to approximate a life-like
appearance is a representation no more “realistic” and imparting no greater
sense of life, movement, or spatial existence than an Impressionist or a
Chinese ink painting is capable of achieving.
The Franklin Mint Corp. decision is significant because it relies
upon degrees of naturalism (or conversely abstraction) as a measure of proof
regarding unauthorized copying. This method recalls the “abstractions test”
of Judge Hand.121 Proof of access to a work becomes irrelevant under this
analytical approach. Regardless of whether the copier has directly
appropriated or independently created his image, the style of the wo rk under
the Third Circuit’s approach diminishes or, at the very least, mitigates the
importance of substantial similarity. In its statement that copyright is weak
in images where “the expression and the subject matter converge,”122 the
court equates naturalism as a style with the objective apprehension of
content.123 The court asserts that:
[I]n the world of fine art, the ease with which a copyright
may be delineated may depend on the artist's style. A
painter like Monet when dwelling upon impressions created
by light on the facade of the Rouen Cathedral is apt to
create a work which can make infringement attempts
difficult. On the other hand, an artist who produces a
rendition with photograph-like clarity and accuracy may be
hard pressed to prove unlawful copying by another who
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Fernie, supra n. 73, at 358. “The point is well illustrated by the story of the Japanese artist who, on
first seeing a perspectival drawing representing a cube, concluded that they made oddly-shaped boxes in
the West.” Id.
119
Janson, supra n. 72, at 179.
120
Franklin Mint Corp., 575 F.2d at 65. Citing Monet’s style, the court states that “in the impressionist's
work the lay observer will be able to differentiate more readily between the reality of subject matter and
subjective effect of the artist's work.” Id.
121
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 119.
122
Franklin Mint Corp., 575 F.2d at 65.
123
Id.
118

Published by eCommons, 2005

62

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol.31.1

uses the same subject matter and the same technique.124

This construct stresses the subjectivity or idiosyncrasy of artistic style as a
quality that extends in a continuum of abstraction from some archetypal
representation of photographic accuracy. The court’s conception of images
as signs that correspond to ideas expressed in language represents a tidy
solution to the problem of delineating where idea and expression diverge. In
this context, the idea of a “cat” presumably corresponds to a photographic
image of the judge’s domestic pet. 125 But this raises further complications
insofar as everyone is familiar with a cat or a tree, those subjects are only
broad categorical delineations within which there exist innumerable
differentiations.
The court addresses the problem of formal variation by relying on
expert testimony about the cardinal artist’s naturalism as belonging to
“conventions in ornithological art which tend to limit novelty in depictions
of the birds.”126 These conventions constitute a particular representational
style where “minute attention to detail of plumage and other physical
characteristics is required and the stance of the birds must be anatomically
correct.” 127 In such terms, the expert testimony also describes pictorial
naturalism itself. Do the paintings of America’s most famous ornithologist,
John James Audubon, conform to such conventions? Most likely they do,
but it is also apparent that Audubon’s style, though accurate in its physical
depictions, also employed dramatic and emotional effects in the attitudes
and activities of his feathered subjects. 128 From his own writings, it is
immediately clear that Audubon “viewed birds in terms of human
characteristics.” 129 The cardinals painted for the parties in Franklin Mint
Corp. were not intended for ornithological guides, but for the collectibles
market. As such, their representation is no more “scientific” or objective
than other paintings of cardinals and is not subject to any “limitations
imposed upon the artist by convention,”130 other than those of the intended
art market. In its suggestion of some shared objective notion of a cardinal as
evidence of a weak copyright, the court in Franklin Mint Corp. held that
naturalism as a style at issue in this case is not protected by copyright.131
Finding evidence of substantial similarity, the Franklin Mint Corp.
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127
Id.
128
Edward Rothstein, A Rare Sighting of Audubon Prepares to Take Flight, N.Y. Times E1 (March 17,
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court does not consider any fair use defense, but agrees with the defendant’s
assertion that the cardinals represent “variations on a theme.”132 Apart from
the reversal in the male and female birds’ positions and some minor
variations in plumage, the paintings are essentially alike. Having gone to
considerable lengths in arguing the weak level of copyright protection for
the pictorial style and subject at issue, the court equates “variation on a
theme”133 with the possible expressions of an idea.134 This conclusion runs
contrary to its assertion that such paintings belong to a single conventional
style, thus limiting the expression to a single naturalistic depiction of the
bird.
The Franklin Mint Corp. opinion asserts both evidence of
substantial similarity and an unwillingness to lend copyright protection to
style. The consideration of style in relation to the subject of a work is also
present in Esquire, Inc. v. Varga Enterprises, Inc., 135 decided 30 years
before. In Esquire, Inc., the opinion could have ended with its finding that
pictorial differences between the alleged copies and their original models
proved insufficient substantial similarity.136 Instead, the court addressed the
artist’s style in relation to his subject (the calendar girl) because of the
overwhelming stylistic similarity in all of the artist’s work. 137 In
considering artistic style, the court asserts that “no single item of distinction
would, in itself, render a particular painting free of infringement.”138 The
analysis in Esquire, Inc. involved “over one hundred paintings by
defendant . . . [suggesting] that all his future drawings will bear some
similarity to his previous work . . . . He has a certain type of art in his mind
and consequently, that is all he is able to express.” 139 Yet the same could be
said of any artist who works in the same stylistic idiom identified with a
particular pictorial treatment, use of color, form, or subject matter.
Contrary to the Franklin Mint Corp.’s holding on similarity of style
as non-infringement, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found a
defendant’s movie poster was infringing because it was substantially similar
to a plaintiff’s magazine cover illustration. 140 In Steinberg, the original
illustration at issue was a myopic rendering of the world from the point of
view of a resident New Yorker. The court describes the image as “a bird's
eye view across a portion of the western edge of Manhattan, past the
Hudson River and a telescoped version of the rest of the United States and
the Pacific Ocean, to a red strip of horizon, beneath which are three flat land
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masses labeled China, Japan and Russia.” 141 The portion depicting
Manhattan is a relatively detailed rendering in “[t]he whimsical, sketchy
style and spiky lettering . . . recognizable as Steinberg's.”142 Comparing the
two works, the court states that “one can see the striking stylistic
relationship between the posters, and since style is one ingredient of
‘expression,’ this relationship is significant.”143
Finding infringement, Steinberg established copyright protection not
only for the plaintiff’s cover illustration of the March 29, 1976 issue of The
New Yorker, but also to his style. The whimsical, sketchy treatment of
forms cited as one of Steinberg’s hallmarks is but one of a number of
pictorial elements mentioned by the court that constitute the Steinberg style.
Other elements of the artist’s work include shapes, “configurations of
various edifices . . . ornaments, facades and details of Steinberg’s
buildings.”144 These aspects of Steinberg’s image, appearing simultaneously
in combination with each other, coalesce into Steinberg’s distinct style – a
Steinberg image of the city. In its most telling assertion, the court stated the
“strongest similarity” 145 between the two works is the artists’ choice of
“vantage point that looks directly down a wide two-way cross street that
intersects two avenues.”146 This type of perspective represents both an idea
about how one perceives the city and an expression of depth. As such, the
court considered this aerial viewpoint as the single compositional trait that,
apart from the sketchy rendering, is unmistakably Steinberg’s. While there
are many examples of images depicting a mapped city as viewed from a
position above the earth, this view of the city is Steinberg’s.
The similarities between Steinberg’s cover and the infringing poster
include both style and subject matter, in that both works depict cities and the
surrounding earth through a “parochial” point of view.147 Yet there are
significant differences of style and content between the works. The court
acknowledges that, unlike the singular style of Steinberg’s cover illustration,
the defendant’s poster:
is executed in a blend of styles: the three characters, whose
likenesses were copied from a photograph, have realistic
faces and somewhat sketchy clothing, and the city blocks
are drawn in a fairly detailed but sketchy style. The
lettering on the drawing is spiky, in block-printed
handwritten capital letters substantially identical to
plaintiff's, while the printed texts at the top and bottom of
the poster are in the typeface commonly associated with The
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New Yorker magazine.148

Despite these differences, the court’s decision focused on Steinberg’s style
despite the fact that, as pictorial subjects, one city is New York and the other
is unmistakably Moscow. In holding the depiction of Moscow infringed
upon Steinberg’s image of New York, the court viewed the infringing matter
as one of style between two inexact, yet similar looking works of art. In
Steinberg, substantial similarity and infringement rested on the similarity of
style.
Style may be understood as the sum of artistic decisions involved in
the creation of a work of art. An artist’s individual style encompasses both
his conception of a subject and its expression, in that the former can only be
understood as the latter. A cardinal, for the purposes of the Franklin Mint
Corp.’s retail market in prints, is painted to look a certain way just as Saul
Steinberg paints his own representation of New York City for The New
Yorker magazine – both images are grounded in the artists’ respective
intentions. Nevertheless, one court seizes on the perceived objectivity of
style at issue in Franklin Mint Corp., whereas another bases its decision on
the perceived subjectivity of the style at issue in Steinberg. The different
holdings arise out of judicial determinations that certain styles should be
granted more protection and others deserve less. While such rationale is not
exactly fair in its application to artists and their works, courts appear to rely
on such reasoning as an expedient approach to the role of substantial
similarity in the infringement analysis. Style, as a function of artistic
production, is intrinsically subjective in that it consists of conventions of
representation far more complex and subjective than image-making as a
physiological function of vision. When one considers that the prevailing
engagement in twentieth century art has been with the abstraction of forms,
to speak of objectivity in art becomes absurd. Figurative art, that is work
resembling something else, is no less subjective than abstract art, for both
represent specific intentions through particular conventions.
The role of style in infringement cases involving art represents a
concession to copyright law at the expense of artistic license. Protection
granted to “subjective” styles (those more obviously depicting degrees of
abstraction) furthers the Constitutional aim of promoting progress. Such
protection ensures the preservation of a plurality of art forms and aesthetic
theories, thereby upholding Justice Holmes’s notion of a marketplace of
ideas. 149 On the other hand, the privileging of one perceived category of
style over another places a legal limitation on an artist’s ability to create
according to his individual intentions and to address subjects of his choosing.
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This kind of limitation may chill expression, thereby diminishing the
diversity of forms. Analysis of the Rogers decision below reveals how such
limitations are contrary to copyright’s purpose by substituting economic
interests over artistic and intellectual diversity.
2.

Judicial Interpretation of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Visual
Art

Under the Act, infringement analysis requires that courts separate
the idea of a work from its expression to distinguish content that is
protected.150 As a corollary of substantial similarity, the idea/expression
dichotomy is a vague analytical instrument. The distinction involves the
notion that an idea exists in the public domain, whereas its expression
connotes that which is “fixed in any tangible medium.”151 As determined in
the preceding discussion of Franklin Mint Corp., the issue applied to the
visual arts is whether the idea or theme underlying a work of art is expressed
in an objective or subjective way. Yet, this distinction relies on judicial
interpretations of the meaning or content of a work of art and ultimately its
value in cultural and economic terms. According to the Franklin Mint Corp.
court, artistic subjectivity establishes originality or novelty and is therefore
consistent with the objects of copyright protection (i.e. “original work[s] of
authorship”).152 In contrast, objectivity arises when the subject or idea of a
work determines its expression and is therefore not as deserving of
protection.
Relying on this framework of style, courts must first define the
underlying idea of a work of art. This is a considerable task, and one that is
itself a subjective exercise given the range of interpretive possibilities that
each work of art presents. Are courts equipped to contend with the
economic, social, cultural, and historical contexts involved in constructing
the meaning or idea that a work represents? Moreover, can the court, by
stepping into the shoes of art-historians, curators, and connoisseurs, act as
an arbiter of culture and determine whether a work is a legitimate expression
of a particular idea? This section examines the process and consequences of
judicial interpretation involving the idea/expression dichotomy as it applies
to works of art. The analysis focuses on one of a number of infringement
claims brought against Jeff Koons, a controversial appropriation artist who
rose to fame in the 1980s.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals offers a relatively
straightforward illustration in applying the idea/expression dichotomy in
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian.153 The court held that the
copyright in the plaintiff’s jeweled bee pin was not infringed by a nearly
exact copy because both were “lifelike representations of a natural
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creature.”154 Initially, the court’s rationale that the expression of the jeweled
setting was a “function of the size and form of the bee pin and the size of the
jewels used,”155 appears sound. To the Ninth Circuit, the representation or
expression of a jeweled bee suggests an inevitable arrangement of gems,
colors, and proportions. But it is reductive speculation to conclude that the
idea behind the work was simply a bee, and that bee, as a concept, entails
few representational alternatives. The choice of jewels, their forms and
arrangement, reflect a subtle process – a conceptual realization that is
ignored by the court. The artist or craftsman has not created any bee, but a
specific bee, represented in an individual style despite its general
resemblance to the insect.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Rogers presents a more complex
and problematic application of the idea/expression dichotomy. In Rogers,
the court found the defendant artist’s appropriation of a commercial
notecard image as the basis for three wood polychrome sculptures was an
infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright.156 The court rejected Koons’s fair
use defense that his sculpture, “String of Puppies,” was a parody of the
plaintiff’s work.157 “String of Puppies” was displayed as part of the artist’s
exhibition entitled “Banality Show” at Manhattan’s Sonnabend Gallery in
1988. 158 The court recognized Koons’s rationale for choosing the notecard
image, stating:
Koons saw certain criteria in the notecard that he thought
made it a workable source. He believed it to be typical,
commonplace and familiar. The notecard was also similar to
other images of people holding animals that Koons had
collected. Thus, he viewed the picture as part of the mass
culture – “resting in the collective sub-consciousness of
people regardless of whether the card had actually ever been
seen by such people.”159

For display in Banality Show, Koons seized upon the image because it
embodied what he considered qualities of cuteness, banality, and kitsch.
Thus, the criteria mentioned by the court are qualities embodied by the
image’s style. For Koons, the content of the image, a couple holding several
puppies,160 constitutes much of its stylistic appeal. In other words, it is
impossible to speak of the image as an expression of kitsch or banality
without referring to its content.
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The notecard’s capacity to convey qualities sought by Koons was so
potent that “Koons stressed that he wanted ‘Puppies’ copied faithfully in the
sculpture.” 161 Yet the court did not view the copying as an aesthetic or
artistic choice, but as “much more than would have been necessary even if
the sculpture had been a parody of plaintiff's work.”162 Temporarily setting
aside the issue of parody, here the court inserts its own opinion of what
amount should or should not be copied. Thus, the issue of infringement in
this case is complicated not only by the court’s interpretation of Koons’s
copying, but also by its assertion of an artistic value judgment. It is likely
that the “essence of Rogers' photograph was copied nearly in toto” 163 in
order to meet the stylistic intentions of the artist’s work.164 Nevertheless,
the court found that the expression of the original, “as caught in the
placement, in the particular light, and in the expressions of the subjects,”165
had been impermissibly copied.166 The court asserted that “the idea of a
couple with eight small puppies seated on a bench”167 is not protected. 168
But it was the specificity of the image that provided the subject for Koons,
not some abstract notion involving a couple holding puppies. This
specificity exists through the stylistic conventions of specific lighting,
attitudes, and expressions that form the image. In other words, the
expression of the postcard is a significant component of the idea or theme
behind Koons’s appropriation.
The assertion that it is the expression “of a couple with eight small
puppies seated on a bench that is protected,” 169 is an inaccurate
oversimplification of the idea expressed by “String of Puppies.”170 The
court does not recognize that there could be a number of ideas or themes
that inform a work of art. It is not simply the subject of representation that
is the idea expressed in a painting or sculpture. Rather, it is a matter of
interpretation beginning with an inquiry into the choice of subject, the
method of representation, and the context of display that determine the
idea(s) informing a work. Thus, with regard to two separate works of art, it
is possible to have a shared representation that is an expression of very
different ideas, as is the case in Rogers. This is especially true for
appropriation art that, as another presentation or reconsideration of the
original, re-contextualizes and brings renewed scrutiny to a preexisting work.
In other words, it is the artist’s intention that one views a work that is a copy,
including its copied content, in a new light. As discussed below, the notion
of reconsideration plays a significant role in a fair use defense for
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infringement claims involving appropriation art.
A recent Fifth Circuit decision, Peel & Company, Inc. v. The Rug
Market,171 is an opinion where the appropriation of style weighed in favor of
finding infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright. The claim in Peel &
Company, Inc. involved plaintiff’s copyright of a “Directoire” carpet named
after the “early Eighteenth Century French historical period that inspired the
rug's pattern.” 172 The plaintiff raised genuine issues of material fact
regarding access to its design (as opposed to independent creation) and the
degree of substantial similarity between the two carpets. 173 The district
court finding in favor of the defendant was reversed and remanded. 174
Regarding the question of substantial similarity in Peel & Company, Inc.,
the court established which elements of the “Directoire” design were
“unique and therefore protectible by copyright.” 175 This finding of fact
relied on the plaintiff’s testimony that it alone employed those elements in
its version of “Directoire.”176
In Peel & Company, Inc., the claim of infringement concerned the
rug’s design or style. The court faced the problem of separating the idea of
the “Directoire” from its design when there were clear stylistic distinctions
in the defendant’s version (“Tessoro”).177 Whereas the district court found
the rugs dissimilar enough to find for the defendant,178 the Fifth Circuit
disagreed. The appellate opinion predicted that an ordinary observer in the
audience test would find the rugs satisfied the substantial similarity test. 179
According to the court, different observers “could differ as to whether these
two rugs are probatively similar.”180 Nevertheless, a layperson “could find
the appearance of the two rugs similar enough to support a conclusion of
copying.”181 Application of the idea/expression analysis would ask whether
the parties’ rugs were expressions of two different ideas (non-infringing), or
whether a single idea was expressed in a substantially similar manner
(infringing). In remanding the case for a jury verdict using the audience
test, 182 the court avoids this seemingly impossible task. To engage in such
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238 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 393. The “Directoire” pattern “features two rows of panels, each of which is decorated with a
central floral design and trompe l'oeil triangular shading intended to suggest a coffered ceiling. The
Directoire also features laurel garlands, punctuated by rosettes, surrounding each panel, and an outer
border of repeated squares.” Id.
173
Id. at 398.
174
Id. at 399.
175
Id. at 398.
176
“Although other Directoire-style rugs exist, Peel claims that it alone incorporates the trompe l'oeil
triangular shading and square-patterned border into its design.” Id. at 393.
177
Id. at 397.
178
Id. The district court “acknowledged that ‘these two rugs at first glance do have a certain similarity to
each o ther,’ but held that ‘no reasonable person would mistake these two rugs as being the same. The
two rugs quite obviously do not have the same aesthetic appeal.’” Id.
179
Id. at 398. Under the ordinary observer or audience test “a layman must detect piracy” independent of
any outside analysis. Id.
180
Id. at 397.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 399.
172

Published by eCommons, 2005

70

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol.31.1

an inquiry would entail further speculation and subjective reasoning, much
like the subjective artistic judgments of intention and meaning evident in the
Rogers case. Only here, the discussion would involve the meaning or idea
behind a rug instead of a sculpture.
It is clear that with regard to works of visual art, application of the
idea/expression dichotomy is an unreliable measure for determinations of
substantial similarity and infringement. The use of this standard must
involve some account of the artist’s intentions behind the work of art;
otherwise, courts will continue to exercise their own artistic judgments
asserting individual taste as a basis for their opinions. A defendant artist’s
intentions can be raised in the assertion of fair use as a defense to
infringement claims, and it is in this context that such infringement claims
should be decided.
B.

Style as a Function of Originality in Copyright Infringement
Analysis

The notion of style applied to infringement claims involving works
of art is linked to a problem of originality in authorship. The Act protects
“art reproductions”183 under the category of pictorial works. But courts also
require that “the reproduction must contain ‘an original contribution not
present in the underlying work of art’ and be ‘more than a mere copy.’”184
An original contribution is only apparent as an expression of either an idea
or some intent on the part of the author. In this context, an artist’s stylistic
contribution to an original work then transforms it into a secondary, but also
copyrightable work of art. Thus, the standard for originality is attached to
the notion of substantial similarity in that a work may constitute a copy in an
analysis for infringement, but also represent an independent work on its own
stylistic terms. To understand the implications of this apparent contradiction,
it is helpful to consider the ways in which style operates as a function of
originality within the infringement analysis.
In L. Batlin & Son, Inc., the Second Circuit found defendant’s toy
copy of a cast-iron bank (in the public domain) was not sufficiently original
to warrant copyright protection. 185 To be copyrightable, the work in
question “must be original, that is, the author's tangible expression of his
ideas.” 186 In this case, minor variations in the bank were deemed the result
of creating a plastic toy from an original cast-iron object, and this
functionality was not considered the author’s own expression. 187 The
court’s approach focused on the process of creation over the stylistic
expression of the work. In L. Batlin & Sons, Inc., originality is founded on
artistic intention that serves “the public interest in promoting progress in the
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arts.”188 The opinion subsequently refers to the originality, hence right to
protection, in works of art based on “quite ordinary mass-produced
items.” 189 Here, the court extends the scope of what constitutes art beyond
what is traditionally considered fine art (as wholly original) to works that
encompass more prosaic aspects of contemporary visual culture (works of
mechanical reproduction). The holding suggests the distinction that copies
of works in the public domain may be considered independent works of art,
whereas copies of protected works are not. This distinction is problematic
because the court’s notion of original art is predicated upon what is and is
not permissible under copyright law.
Although L. Batlin & Sons, Inc. concerned copyright of a copy
based on a work in the public domain, the court’s originality standard
nevertheless recognized that style is an integral function of originality.
Variation resulting from the production of a work, but not from a decision
based on stylistic or aesthetic considerations, was not deemed sufficiently
original. In an earlier decision, Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
Inc., 190 the Second Circuit considered the issue of originality as both a
function of production and of stylistic intention. 191 Alfred Bell & Co.
considered whether a plaintiff’s mezzotint art reproductions of paintings
were original works of art infringed by a defendant’s copying.192 The court
held that the mezzotint works were original works of art protected by
copyright and that defendant’s copying constituted infringement. 193 As
“translations, or other versions of works in the public domain,”194 the prints
were protected “even if their substantial departures from the paintings were
inadvertent.” 195 The prints’ originality lay in the fact they were “not
intended to, and did not, imitate the paintings they reproduced.”196 The
creation of the prints through engraving represented a process of image
translation, which resulted in pictorial effects different from those in the
original painted models. The prints appropriated prior images as the basis
for new works of art. The determination of their status as original works of
art turned on their stylistic originality. Yet, the prints in Alfred Bell & Co.
were based on paintings in the public domain, which remains a significant
factor in the determination of their status as original art in the infringement
analysis. 197
Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger198 also considered the originality of
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a work based on art in the public domain.199 Here, the Southern District
Court of New York upheld a plaintiff’s claim of infringement against a
defendant who copied plaintiff’s plaster replicas of Auguste Rodin’s “Hand
of God.”200 The plaintiff’s replicas were created in collaboration with and
pursuant to the authority of museums that own the original works of
sculpture.201 The plaintiff’s copying of the sculpture was held to be original
and thus protected b y copyright, because it was an exact copy of the Rodin
sculpture. 202 The court resolved the tension of coinciding similarity and
originality by focusing on the process of replication and the reduction in
scale. 203 The replica was original because “great skill and originality is
called for when one seeks to produce a scale reduction of a great work with
exactitude.” 204 As in Alfred Bell & Co., the combination of production and
style (here, the exactness) lent the work originality. Yet the court’s holding
contradicts its own rule that “to be entitled to copyright, the work must be
original in the sense that the author has created it by his own skill, labor and
judgment without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of
another.”205 The very act of copying to achieve the degree of exactness in
the plaintiff’s work requires that an artist engage in direct copying. The
plaintiff’s work was meant to imitate every formal subtlety in Rodin’s
sculpture; otherwise, the plaintiff would not have been granted the
authorization to create the replica.
Although not appropriation art, the plaintiff’s copy in Alva Studios,
Inc. finds its source in a prior work of art, albeit one that is in the public
domain. As the discussion below asserts, when art is based on work that is
protected, courts have less difficulty in determining a lack of originality in
the copy. This is significant because it is a work’s originality that not only
determines its right to protection, but also its identity as a distinct work of
art. What is relevant to the aforementioned decision regarding style and
originality is the degree to which individual judicial determinations of
artistic value or merit intrude upon determinations of original works of art.
Alva Studios, Inc. and Alfred Bell & Co. are cases that consider style as a
function of originality in opposing ways. In the former case, imitation of
Rodin is the crucial factor in determining originality. Whereas in the latter
case, it is the prints’ lack of imitation and intent to copy that proves the
absence of originality. As discussed below, in cases of appropriation art, a
finding of intent to imitate is the death knell for a defendant’s assertion of
fair use.
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Appropriation Art and Fair Use

Not all copying of visual imagery constitutes appropriation art.
Sometimes an image does not serve an artistic function, but a purely
commercial one. The artistic or commercial purpose (or intention) of a
work is considered under the defense of “fair use.”206 After probative or
substantial similarity has been established, a determination of whether
copying is legitimate or infringing usually turns on fair use analysis. The
Second Circuit’s opinion in Rogers is the most significant decision
involving fair use and appropriation art. The opinion reflects both a lack of
understanding and sensitivity toward artistic intentions, and a misreading of
the statutory guidelines used to analyze the fair use defense. Rogers is also
a precedent that has since been decisive in two other appropriation art cases
involving the same artist, Jeff Koons. In this context, it has effectively
removed fair use as a defense in cases involving appropriation art. In the
face of evolving theories concerning art, history, and language – significant
branches of the western intellectual tradition – the Rogers holding represents
an apparently fixed anachronism in its application of copyright law. This
section examines the interpretive mistakes involving fair use and
appropriation art in the Koons cases, and why such fair use defenses have
failed to persuade.
Fair use is one of the most common and most controversial
limitations upon the exclusive rights of copyright owners. Codified in § 107
of the Act, fair use allows copying “for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research.”207 Thus, a defendant must argue that the use of
copyrighted material corresponds to one of the statutory purposes
considered exempt from the reach of copyright protection. In analyzing
whether a defendant’s use is fair, courts look to four non-exclusive f actors
suggested by the Act:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.208
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With regard to works of art, “purpose and character” is further analyzed
according to whether the work merely replaces the original, or whether it
transforms the original by “altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message.” 209 Factors one and four are especially influential in
determining fair use as they involve the protection of an artist’s creative and
financial interests. In appropriation art cases, the amount and substantiality
of use is more likely to weigh against the defendant because of the extent of
copying involved.
In Rogers, defendant Koons argued that the purpose and character
of his use was parody.210 The Rogers opinion appears two years before the
Supreme Court decided, for the first time, a case on the issue of parody as
fair use in Campbell.211 In Campbell, the Court characterized parody as able
to “provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the
process, creating a new one.”212 Moreover, “[p]arody needs to mimic an
original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its
victim's (or collective victims') imagination, whereas satire can stand on its
own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”213
An essential element of parody for the Court is “the use of some elements of
a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part,
comments on that author's works.”214
This requirement of comment on the original arises in Rogers and
ostensibly forms the basis for the Second Circuit’s dismissal of Koons’s fair
use defense.215 Koons stated his work was both parody and satire “of
society at large,” 216 based on social criticism of “the mass production of
commodities and media images [that] has caused a deterioration in the
quality of society.” 217 The court reasoned “that even given that ‘String of
Puppies’ is a satirical critique of our materialistic society, it is difficult to
discern any parody of the photograph ‘Puppies’ itself.”218 The requirement
that the work parody the original was qualified as doing so “at least in
part”219 by the Supreme Court, but was found to be totally absent in Rogers.
It is significant that the Second Circuit found no comment upon the original
notecard, when it seems reasonable to view every copy as implicating its
original on some level. The Rogers court argued that the intention of the
work did not involve the notecard and that it was necessary that:

209
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (holding that defendant’s rap song
copying lyrical phrases from copyright protected ballad constituted fair use as parody and that
commercial nature of use is not presumptively unfair).
210
960 F.2d at 309.
211
5 10 U.S. at 579.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 580-81.
214
Id. at 580.
215
960 F.2d at 310.
216
Id. at 309.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 310.
219
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 .

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol31/iss1/3

2005]

“I’LL BE YOUR MIRROR”

75

[T]he audience be aware that underlying the parody there is
an original and separate expression, attributable to a
different artist. This awareness may come from the fact that
the copied work is publicly known or because its existence
is in some manner acknowledged by the parodist in
connection with the parody.220
How can a visual artist express acknowledgement of an original work’s
existence in his appropriation? It would appear impossible to do so without
actually pasting an explanatory note upon or next to the work, like the wall
texts one finds beside works in museums. Moreover, by requiring either an
expression of acknowledgement or that the original be publicly known, the
court h as placed an inconceivable limitation on artistic expression that raises
questions of constitutionality under the First Amendment.
The opinion in United Feature Syndicate v. Koons221 follows the
same approach to parody as Rogers, finding that the work in question was
not “a comment, criticism, or parody directed, in any way, at ‘Odie’,”222 the
original work. The work at issue in United Feature Syndicate was a
porcelain sculpture that included a figure of a dog, “Odie,” a copyright
protected character from “Garfield” comics. 223 In this case, Koons featured
the character alongside the figure of a boy in a sculptural group entitled
“Wild Boy and Puppy.”224 Despite its incorporation in a larger work of art,
and in a different context, the court granted summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff.225 That same year, the court once again ruled against Koons in
Campbell v. Koons, 226 a similar suit involving the appropriation of a
photographic image as the basis of a sculpture.227
Both the Southern District Court of New York and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals decided cases against Koons on the grounds that
his assertion of parody as fair use did not apply. But there are statements in
these opinions that not only involve judicial interpretations of aesthetics and
artistic integrity, but that also suggest an unflattering view of Koons, his art,
and the commercialism of the gallery system. References to the artist’s
prior work as “mutual funds salesman, a registered commodities salesman
and broker, and a commodities futures broker,”228 and his “profit-making
motives”229 are cynical references to the artist’s character and his motives. 230
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The court even selects an article (out of a number of reviews) in which, “[a]
New York Times critic complained that ‘Koons is pushing the relationship
between art and money so far that everyone involved comes out looking
slightly absurd.[’]”231 It is significant that the Koons cases were decided in
the early 1990s after the period of high prices that works by many
contemporary New York artists commanded. The historical context is worth
mentioning here. In New York during the late 1980s, a sub-culture that
revolved around the excesses of Wall Street financiers arose, dubbed the
“Nouvelle Society,” 232 epitomizing opulence and naked materialism. The
New York art scene, the center of the contemporary art world, was not
unaffected by the conspicuous consumption of the times. In this context,
Jeff Koons was considered one of the enfants terribles of the Manhattan
gallery scene.233
Although the prices for Koons’s works shocked many a decade ago
and continue to do so today, the value of the work is, to a considerable
extent, determined by the market and demand. Given the court’s unmasked
distaste for his artistic endeavors, it is probable that had Koons argued
comment or criticism as the basis of his fair use defense, the court would
have ruled no differently. Yet, the defenses of parody, comment, and
criticism are all appropriate fair use defenses in these cases. Appropriation
art functions in all of these ways because it sets up an original work or a
style and its associations for interpretation as fine art (high culture). The
prices for Koons’s porcelain, wood, and metal sculptures234 play on notions
of value, materialism, social conventions, history, and the very notion of
what constitutes art. A decade after the courts’ skeptical pronouncements
upon his work, Koons is viewed as “reviving exhausted motifs and
outmoded objets d'art mediums, like glazed ceramic and polychrome carved
wood. . . . [A]t his best, his work is a kind of kitsch rescue mission that
resuscitates clichés of both image and craft.”235 That Koons had skilled
artisans transform snapshots of everyday kitsch into expensive sculpture for
230
The Second Circuit also discussed infringing profits in the Rogers cases stating, “Koons' wilful [sic]
and egregious behavior, we think Rogers may be a good candidate for enhanced statutory damages
pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504 (c)(2).” Id. at 313.
231
Id. at 304.
232
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his Banality Show may be interpreted as a glorification of the banal as
symptomatic of the crass commercialism and decadence in urban American
culture of the period. In this context, the work represents a commodity to be
regarded as a fetish object.236 His distanced manufacturing and reproduction
of the work reflects a direct challenge to notions of authorship and
autonomy common to the work of other Pop artists such as Warhol and
Johns.
Inconsistent standards for parody, criticism, or comment in fair use
analysis concerning art are apparent in comparing opinions from the
Southern District Court of New York. In 1990, just three years prior to its
decisions in the Koons cases (United Feature Syndicate and Campbell), the
court required a different standard be met concerning the fair use defense.
In Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association, 237 the court dismissed
plaintiff’s claims for copyright infringement, finding fair use in the
defendant’s reproduction of plaintiff’s photographic art. 238
The
Wojnarowicz opinion examined the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s photos in a
fund-raising pamphlet distributed to Congressmen, Christian leaders, and
media venues in a campaign against “the subsidization of ‘offensive’ and
‘blasphemous’ art by the National Endowment for the Arts.”239 Under the
first prong of fair use analysis, the court found “addressing the controversial
issue of federal funding of contemporary art,”240 as comment or criticism
pursuant to the statutory requirement.241 Fair use of art in the Koons cases
required that the original art be the subject of parody so the audience is
aware of the distinct expression of the original work forming the basis of
use.242 It was sufficient that the object of fair use in Wojnarowicz was the
issue of subsidization of work such as the plaintiff’s, unlike in the Koons
cases where it was the artist’s work itself that was the court’s required object
of comment.
Although the district court in the two Koons cases followed the
Second Circuit’s reasoning in Rogers, the shifting standard for analysis
reveals two very different understandings of a crucial element in the fair use
standard. The Wojnarowicz holding makes sense in that the criticism was
aimed at the federal funding of art such as the type created by the plaintiff.
Thus, the work itself, as an example of obscenity, plays an illustrative role
in the criticism of federal funding. Yet, the same court in United Feature
Syndicate and Campbell refused to interpret Koons’s sculptures in a
consistent manner as an artistic comment on a subject illustrated or even
embodied by the plaintiff’s original work. Extending the parody standard
that a copy take as its object or at least acknowledge the original, it would
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be difficult to imagine the fair use statute similarly restricts the objects of
“news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research”243 to the work that is
being copied. Indeed, these other circumstances of fair use may, like art,
seize upon an expression as an instrument for instruction or comment on a
completely different subject. Simply stated, a kindergarten teacher uses
apples in an exercise about addition or subtraction; however, the apples
themselves are not the objects of that lesson. Why should it be unlawful for
works of appropriation art to comment on subjects other than the originals
they copy? Ultimately, contemporary works such as Koons’s sculpture or
the use of photographs in the Wojnarowicz pamphlet speak to us as art or
invective about our society, culture, and values, through the use of an
original, underlying work.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The imprecise application of substantial similarity and the
idea/expression dichotomy is the result of problematic interpretations of
style and meaning in copyright cases involving contemporary art.
Accepting style as expression, courts determine unlawful copying by relying
on stylistic distinctions along a representational spectrum that ranges from
naturalism to abstraction. This analysis induces judgments upon the value
of a work of art in aesthetic, cultural, and economic terms. Yet, within the
frameworks of art history and post-structuralism – theory that helps shape
meaning and representational intent in contemporary art – such judicial
interpretations are constructs that have little to do with the meaning or
function of a work of art. Instead, they represent concessions to the
economic, rather than Constitutional, aims of copyright law. Privileging
specific types of style over others imposes a legal limitation on an artist’s
ability to create according to his individual intent and to address subjects of
his choosing. The objects of artistic attention are no longer only traditional
genres such as landscape, portraiture, or history; instead, they embrace other
expressions of contemporary visual culture, conceptual conceits, and notions
of display, reception, and cultural commodification.
The conflict between goals of contemporary art as cultural
phenomena and those of copyright law as a legal framework have not been
adequately resolved by the courts. In Rogers v. Koons, this tension results
in a holding that, at the very least, chills the production and reception of
certain kinds of art. Substituting economic interests over artistic and
intellectual diversity diminishes the marketplace of ideas and damages the
cultural, intellectual, and political diversity of America. Judicial resistance
to the function of appropriation art in re-considering the roles or associations
an object has in contemporary society inevitably results in failed fair use
defenses. Contemporary art that re-contextualizes and brings renewed
consideration to a preexisting work offers alternative perspectives or
challenges the various forces and identities that shape our lives. To deny an
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artist’s intention that the viewer perceive a subject in a new light is to deny
that particular reading of the subject.
In claims of infringement, it is important that courts re-evaluate
their analysis of fair use defense involving comment, criticism, or parody.
This task requires a better understanding of both the cultural and economic
contexts in which the reception of a work of art takes place. In an
increasingly commercialized world, it is important to understand art as both
a cultural and an economic commodity. The economic value of a work of
art is, to a great extent, distinct from its materiality (i.e. its expression or
medium), but is the product of many factors determining its market value. It
is equally, if not more important that cultural and economic value arise out
of what meaning a work of art conveys or what function it serves, rather
than its stylistic expression or decorative existence. Ultimately, courts must
better understand the critical nature of appropriation art (and contemporary
art generally), and apply a new standard of fair use tailored to cases
involving contemporary art. As § 107 of the Act does not provide an
exclusive list of factors in fair use determinations, a more nuanced
interpretation in its application to contemporary art remains a hopeful
possibility.
Visual art has never been tied only to the empirical physicality of
the world or its representation of that world. It has and continues to operate
on a conceptual level that supersedes its forms and expressions. In this
context, copyright infringement analysis must take into account the function
of visual art as a means of cultural interchange engaging in criticism,
comment, or parody under the statutory codification of fair use. This notion
of interchange would recognize the roles a work of art plays as both cultural
and economic artifact, and as contributing to a larger critical discourse at the
heart of the fair use limitation. Thus, the first question courts must ask is
why the original work has been appropriated and whether the appropriation
is artistic in nature. It may or may not be relevant to the function of a work
of visual art whether it clearly identifies a prior, original form. Nevertheless,
it is not reasonable to expect an audience to recognize or identify the
underlying form. The notion of cultural interchange in art implies that the
precursor (original) is irrelevant in that it inevitably exists in various states
no longer tied to its original context.
In the age of mechanical reproduction, the original is just another
copy existing simultaneously among a plurality of its own presence and
meaning. Although not always part of the public domain defined by
copyright law, the original work is part of a broader visual culture – at once
the repository and source of artistic intent. As appropriation art, the
transformed original participates in a critical discourse framed by this
broader visual culture, a culture increasingly marked by the presence of the
copy regardless of whether courts recognize it as such. As new perceptions
continue to emerge about the ways art, style, and representational intent
operate, courts must incorporate an awareness of this shifting context into
their infringement analysis. Greater flexibility in the application of fair use
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is required if contemporary art is to evolve as an expression of culture and
not merely as a commodity under the rubric of copyright law.
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